Discourses on Khilafah - Reformism undermining Islamic Governance
- Reflections on conversations about Islamic Politics and the Caliphate - Part Two
This is the second part of a series reflections after listening to a discussion between two Muslim academics about Islamic Politics and the Khilāfah. The first video is the discussion itself. The second video is a critique of the same conversation.
In the previous article we tacked the problem of pessimism. In this piece we will examine the idea of reformism, and how that has undermined ideas about Islamic governance.
One of the biggest problems I had with the discussion was how they discussed the issue from a jurisprudence discussion. An average listener could leave this sort of discussion thinking that ‘in an ideal world’ Khilafah is a ‘nice to have’. Whereas for fourteen centuries the unambigous view is that Khilafah is amongst the highest of obligatory, ‘must have’, issues.
Some leading advocates for Khilafah look at the Prophet’s particular model of governance as the ideal - and along with the Rashidun Caliphate, the gold standard to aspire for any future Caliphate to be modelled on. Yet this is somewhat different to the issue of what are the necessary pillars to make the Khilafah valid - the minimum requirements to fulfil the obligation on the Ummah.
We must not confuse the aspirational model of the Prophetic polity and Rashidun Caliphate on the one hand, and the bare minimum requirements on the other. When we evaluate historical Caliphates, the Ummayad, Abbasid and Ottoman Caliphates all met minimum standards to achieve validity. Yet for all their various strengths in their own eras, their weaknesses reflect a deviation from the Prophetic model, and the immediate successors - where practices like hereditary rule crept in, corrupting the bay’ah process though not invalidating it.
Confusion over unitary leadership
There were several inaccuracies in the discussion from the aspect of how jurisprudential opinions were discussed. These were highlighted in the second video I shared. That critique looked at source texts of Islamic scholars who had been referenced to support the justification that it was acceptable (or even preferable in the modern age) for Muslims to have more than one leader was a preferred opinion by these classical scholars.
It is a bizarre suggestion that governance alone would be an exception to the basic Islamic idea of unifying behind one Imam in any given situation! The brother critiquing the discussion clearly showed that what had been referenced had either misunderstood what was being said by the classical scholars - or that they had extended the positions made by those scholars regarding exceptional circumstances to apply to quite different realities. I will not rehearse the details of these arguments again but would direct people to watch that video for themselves.
What can be said is that these pseudo-justifications were focussed on a specific very aspect of the Khilāfah - whether or not the singularity of one Khalīfah for all the Muslims was an agreed upon matter for which there was absolute consensus. The guest speaker seemed to argue that it was not a consensus matter amongst scholars - forwarding various fringe opinions, and (as mentioned) inaccurately or inappropriately citing the arguments of mainstream scholars.
This approach seemed to me more of a reflection of a Western academic approach - looking for ways to challenge the mainstream opinion of centuries - rather than that of an Islamic jurist. The discussion appeared to want to emphasise that, in the opinion of the speaker, the unitary nature of leadership was not necessary - based upon fringe juristic views - and implicitly seeming to want to conform to the political norms of today.
The dominant view - that it is fard for there to be one Khalifah of the Muslims is based on clear textual evidence. To spend effort to argue this is not Qati’ (a definitive matter), and so argue for the opposite, is very much like the reformist opinions justify some of today’s interest-based finance. It might not be crossing the line of denying the prohibition of interest, but its trying to bend the rules to fit the modern world in a way that distorts what has been understood for centuries about Imarah (governance) and Imamah (leadership).
There was a lot of focus on interpreting the word ‘Khilāfah’ from a linguistic meaning - rather than its Shari’ meaning; and reinterpreting the obligation of bayʿah to one Khalīfah as a general prohibition towards anarchy and rebellion. Moreover, historical experience e.g. the schism between Umayyad Andalucia and the Abbasid Caliphate, somehow became a justification for there being a multiplicity of rulers.
Conforming to the modern world
Generally the speakers did not offer many specifics as how governance should be achieved according to the Islamic texts. It seemed as if the broad principles of justice and that there should be the application of Shariʿah in society (the term Shariʿah was not defined - so it is unclear what aspect of Shariʿah the speakers wished to apply) was as specific as they could be.
The discussion then segued into looking at modern nation states, democratic frameworks etc and seemed to ignore or negate the possibility that there could be a prophetic model that was worthy of emulating. If this is really what they meant, then one might expect more detailed rulings on how to grow a beard according to Islam than how to govern from any such contributor!
Over the years, I have always found it extremely problematic when some Muslims would belittle some aspects of Sunnah, like beards and miswak that others emphasise. Even if their point is about prioritising something more important, a Sunnah is a Sunnah and so demands respect, no belittlement.
Yet some commentators on the matter of ruling by Islam either negate the existence of Sunnan in this matter, or belittle the importance of considering those Sunnan in favour of how to try to ‘Islamicise’ modern secular political models, just as others try to ‘Islamicise’ riba-based financial models.
To hear learned academics casually throwing around phrases like Khilāfah ‘would not be in my top twenty list of obligations’, or that its absence would ‘cause me no spiritual crisis’ is frankly extraordinary and not befitting of Islamic scholarship. It is trivialising an issue that the Salaf and classical ulema certainly did not, and should ring alarm bells.
The brother who made the second video, critiquing the first, suggested that there was something about the discussion in the first video that reflected ‘American Islam’ - i.e. a reformist, modernist approach to Islam, that sought to move away from traditional juristic positions to other interpretations that aligned more with the secular modern world. The conversants cited the influence of Rashid Rida (d 1935) - a controversial thinker who was a prominent advocate of the Khilāfah, but whose association with Muhammad ‘Abduh saw him labelled variously as a ‘reformist’ or a ‘revivalist’, following a Salafist tradition.
It is arguable that in selecting the fringe opinions about the multiplicity of Ameers - or taking the arguments of scholars about exceptional situations and generalising them as a norm - all of that does raise questions of why seem to seek to interpret the texts in accordance with how the world currently is, rather than how the world ought to be? Hence the concern that this is a sign of a particular type of ‘American Islam’.
The US-based think-tank RAND, published an influential paper more than twenty years ago titled ‘Civil Democratic Islam’. The thrust of the paper was to try to force a trend away from thinking about Islam and politics rooted in an authentic Islamic tradition towards modern political models - that states should be secular, democratic, nation states that uphold western norms of human rights and gender roles, and accept the global capitalist economic symptoms. The paper framed the discussions in terms of ‘extremists’ versus ‘modernists’ versus ‘secularists’. Their strategy was to try to get traditionalist thinkers to shift towards the modern secular paradigm.
Therefore, Muslims need to be mindful when addressing such subjects that they are not playing into an agenda that is moving towards a ‘Reformation’ of Islam. The Protestant Reformation in Europe was driven by political forces as much as it was by theological arguments, and laid the foundation for the secular states that exist today.
Governance as a target for Reformists
One of the most controversial ‘reformers’ of the early 20th century was Ali Abdel Raziq, an Azhari scholar and student of a more famous reformer Muhammad Abduh. Abduh was said to be in favour with the British colonisers of Egypt, in particular Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer).
In 1925 Abdel Raziq published Islam and the Foundations of Governance, undermining the orthodox views on Islam and governance, including Khilāfah, arguing that Islam does not advocate a specific form of government.
Most of the modern arguments that undermine the idea of Islamic governance as illustrated by the Quran and Sunnah can be said to stem from Abdel Raziq - who in turn was said to have drawn on Orientalist arguments.
Amongst the problematic issues in the work, Abdel Raziq denied the consensus of appointing a Khalīfah, similarly citing fringe opinions from various sects. The Azhari leadership condemned his position citing the tawatur of the consensus of the Muslims during the first period after the death of the Prophet ﷺ over the prohibition of there being a time without a Khalīfah and an Imam. (They used these terms, not implying - as the speaker in the interview did - that all that was needed were a non-specific leader or leaders whose presence would prevent anarchy and disorder. His views had deviated so much from the norm, that a tribunal of scholars from Azhar University went through his work, critiquing it against Islamic texts, eventually concluding that it fell so far below scholarship, he was stripped of his scholarly credentials.
It is uncanny that some of these arguments that were squashed by Azhari scholars in 1920’s Egypt are recycled by people on both sides of the Atlantic in the 2020s.
Creed versus Jurisprudence
The speakers discussed whether those who disagreed with the mainstream views could be labelled Mubtadi’ (blame-worthy innovators) if they disagreed with the dominant view which was being challenged.
Though the scholars of Azhar used that term for Ali Abdel Raziq, I am cautious about the use of such labels. They have been thrown around liberally by people over the past few decades to sow the seeds of division and sectarianism.
However, avoiding liberal use of such labels should not imply that we avoid criticism (even robust criticism) of challenges to normative views - or strong cautions about where such discussions can lead.
Despite the fact that discussions about Khilāfah were historically included in the category of aqīdah, it is broadly correct that the matter of governance is basically a matter of jurisprudence. As such the jurists of the past who addressed this issue started examining and struggling with the Shariʿah texts sincerely, to where the texts led, in as unbiased way as possible to try to understand the ḥukm of Allah on any given issue.
Yet one of the most bizarre things about the interview was their obsession with showing that the opinion held for centuries, that Khilāfah was understood as a unitary political leadership of the Ummah- succeeding the leadership of the Prophet ﷺ in ruling but NOT in Prophethood, who is given a bayʿah (pledge) to rule according to the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger ﷺ - was not a consensus issue. This was a red herring. Much (indeed, most) of fiqh is not consensus - but that never invalidated the strongest opinions. In such matters, despite the strength of juristic opinions, scholars would say that they felt their views were most correct - but allowed for the possibility they could be wrong and another issue correct.
The one aspect of jurisprudence that does have implications for belief is when those matters that are known in Islam by necessity (maʾlum min ad-dīn bid-darūrah). Khilāfah was historically consider one of those issues - so to deny it absolutely could invite accusations of kufr. Hence, the great care with which these speakers chose to acknowledge the aspects about which there is consensus - but still choosing to focus on the one aspect about which they felt it was possible to stretch an interpretation upon, regardless of the fact that the strongest opinion universally expressed over centuries - even reinterpreting what others said about unitary leadership to fit their own conclusions.
In the coming articles sharing my reflections on this interview, I will address where Khilafah sits in terms of Shariah priorities; what kind of Caliphate; authoritarianism; and centralisation; Sunnah governance versus nation states.