This is the fourth part of a reflection on a discussion I heard between two Muslim academics about Islamic Politics and the Khilāfah. (The first video is the discussion. The second video is a critique of the same conversation.)
In this article I plan to discuss:
How should we view Khilāfah as a system of governance?
Given the confused conversation that exists about Khilāfah these days, I will focus my discussion on these areas:
Whether Khilāfah is an essential Islamic requirement or an optional ideal
What would constitute a minimum requirement for Khilāfah
The ideal of Sunnah governance that we should aspire towards
A Sunnah-paradigm versus a pragmatic-paradigm
Khilāfah: Nice-to-have or must-have?
One of the biggest problems I sensed with the discussion was that I felt these two academics might leave an average listener thinking that Khilāfah is a ‘nice to have’ issue - that in an ideal world we would have this thing called Khilāfah, but if it doesn’t exist and we live in modern nation states but are allowed to pray and fast, then that’s acceptable.
To leave people with this impression, however unintended, is unacceptable. The view for fourteen centuries is that Khilāfah is an obligatory matter - a ‘must have’ issue for the Muslim Ummah. The evidence for this in terms of Shari’ texts is extensive and classical scholarly opinions from all schools of thought are too numerous to enrich an article like this. Yet I will cite just two opinions that put into perspective the weight of the discussion on Khilāfah, in comparison to the dismissive tone with which it was discussed by these academics.
In an article for the Ummatics institute, Shaikh Asim Ayub translated a passage from the creedal tract al-Tamhīd fi Bayan al-Tawḥīd by Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī (d. 460 H/1066 CE) in which he wrote:
Know that the caliphate is an established matter [in the dīn] and that political leadership is an established and legislated affair. It is obligatory on the people that they appoint for themselves an imām. This is proven by the Qurʾan, the Sunna, and the Consensus of the Umma. As for the Qurʾan, Allah says, “O you who believe, obey Allah, obey the Messenger, and those in authority among you.” As for the Sunna, when the Prophet [ﷺ] passed away the Companions, the Muhājirūn and the Ansār, gathered in the roofed shelter of Banī Sāʾida al-Khazrajī and said: “We heard the Messenger of Allah [ﷺ] say, ‘Whoever dies without an imām over him dies a jāhilī death’; it is thus not right that a day pass over us without an imām.” This indicates that whoever denies the necessity of the Imām commits disbelief.
To be clear, the ‘disbelief’ mentioned here does not refer to the sorts of discussions between these two academics. Rather it relates to an outright rejection of the obligation (because its proof is so overwhelming, just as in the case of any matter decisively known in the dīn), not reinterpretations of the obligation in the way that was being discussed by these conversants - who were debating the permissibility of multiple Caliphs/rulers, versus the obligation of ‘preventing fitna and disorder’ in the community. To my understanding the issue of whether Khilāfah is wājib or not is not a matter that is Qati such that it takes the one who rejects its obligation out of the fold of Islam. However scholars included it in the books of aqīdah due to its importance and since early Muslim sects debated its obligation, famously some of the Khawārij negated its obligation.
In his book The Mercy in the Difference of the Four Sunni Schools of Islamic Law, Qāḍī Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Ṣafadī al-Shāfi‘ī (d.784/1378) wrote:
The Imams [Abū Ḥanīfah, Al-Shāfi‘ī, Mālik and Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal] agree that having a ruler [caliph] is an obligation and that the Muslims must have a ruler to establish the practices of the dīn and to give justice to the wronged from those who have wronged them, and that it is not permitted for there to be two rulers over the Muslims at the same time in the world, whether or not they are separate from each other or in agreement…The ruler must be obeyed in respect of all that he commands as long as that does not entail disobedience to Allah, and fighting under him is an obligation, and the judgements of those he appoints must be carried out.
So let all listeners be clear, the matter is of the clearest and highest of Shari’ obligations upon us collectively - and hence the concern I have for the nature of a discussion that could leave listeners feeling it isn’t a must have issue.
What would constitute a ‘minimum requirement’ for Khilāfah?
Another confused aspect of this discussion was defining what is meant by Khilāfah.
The two academics discussed the issue as if Khilāfah would only be achieved when the entire Muslim majority world, from Morocco to Indonesia, is united under one leader - and they based their contentions around this premise.
Whilst political unity of Muslim is an obligation, also not just an “ideal” (as discussed in previous articles), the validity of a Khilāfah is not contingent on all the Muslim countries uniting under one Khalīfah. There is an excellent article on the blog Prophetic Politics, which lays out some of the proofs for this here.
The obligation (not ideal) of political unity aside, the essential elements that would qualify a polity to be a valid Khilāfah are not that the entire Muslim world is united.
Rather there needs to exist: 1) a region wherein the security is in the hands of the Muslims, which is a viable territory to be sustained under a polity, 2) where the sovereignty is for the Shari’ah of Allah; and 3) a bay’ah has been given, by those who can be truly said to represent the authority of the Muslims (within that territory), to a ruler who would rule by Islam as the Caliph for the Muslims.
Such a bay’ah in those circumstances and with those conditions would legitimise the ruler to be the Caliph, for all the Muslims, even if he lived far away and did not have genuine power over those territories - for example, just as the Muslims of India viewed the Ottoman Caliph prior to 1924.
So if such a change were to take place in any region of the Muslim world, then it would constitute a fulfilment of the obligation of Khilāfah, around which unity should occur. The existence of disunity, as in the past, didn’t invalidate a legitimate Khilāfah - rather the ones who refused to unify were sinful, even if they themselves ruled by Islam and established the Shari’ah and looked after peoples’ affairs as a ruler should - because it was dividing the Jama’ah’ of the Ummah and going against the express command of the Prophet ﷺ
The ideal of Sunnah governance
There are many potential ways to fulfil the minimum requirement for a Khilāfah. Indeed, many contemporary scholars and thinkers propose a modern Khilāfah in such a way as to fulfil the minimum requirements but to align as much as possible with the modern world of nation states.
Whatever the merits of that approach, it cannot be described as aiming for Khilāfah on the method of Prophethood, or following the role model of the Rashidun Caliphate.
Other advocates for Khilāfah look at the Prophet’s ﷺ particular model of governance as being the ideal, and along with the Rashidun Caliphate. These are the gold standards to aspire for which not only fulfil the necessary pillars to make it valid and fulfil the obligation on the Ummah, but also aim to look at the Prophetic way, and the way of his ﷺ immediate successors to see how to aim for that.
There are many reasons for the latter approach.
Firstly, it is more closely linked to the Islamic texts and starts from an approach based on an Islamic paradigm as opposed to trying to fit with today’s status quo.
Second, there is a blessing in looking at the Sunnah for guidance for any Muslim. He ﷺ was the uswatun hasanah - i.e. the best example for us.
Third, there is a specific encouragement from the Prophet ﷺ himself to do this in the matter for ruling and governance, in a ḥadīth narrated by Ibn Majah and another by Abī Dāwūd and at-Tirmidhi.
Whoever among you lives will see great conflict. I urge you to adhere to what you know of my Sunnah and the path of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, and cling stubbornly to it. And you must obey, even if (your leader is) an Abyssinian leader. For the true believer is like a camel with a ring in its nose; wherever it is driven, it complies.
Fourthly, many advocates for the Caliphate look at the Prophet’s ﷺ governance in Al Madinah and identify significant, consistent and repeated patterns of action that emphasise a need for emulation from the perspective of jurisprudence - many of which were emulated in the period of the Rashidūn Caliphate - thereby identifying a model and structure that is to be emulated, even if applied in a contemporary reality.
Many of these have been documented by classical and contemporary scholars - some of which are beautifully summarised in an article by Shaikh Abdalhaq Bewley, that I would urge people to read.
Sunnah governance, alongside the aforementioned essentials required to validate the Caliphate as legitimate, can be summarised in the following way:
A Caliph as a ruler who rules by Islam, and is subject to the law, not above it; a Caliph who is accountable by the judiciary and the people (the people in terms of individuals, political groups, independent media, or a formal body such as a Majlis al Shūrā);
A Caliph who is responsible (as a minimum) for foreign policy, defence, the implementation of the hudūd, organisation of the Jummah prayer, and collection and distribution of zakāt and other revenues;
A Caliph who, whilst they have responsibility for ruling, works with assistants (muāwinīn or wuzarā) to help him achieve governance at a central level (the Prophetic example and that of the Rashidun Caliphate wasn’t to have ‘wazirs’ or ministers who dealt with a narrow portfolio, rather their assistants dealt with societal and human issues in a holistic joined-up way rather than by department as exists in many modern examples);
A Caliph who appoints governors to rule in districts/provinces to achieve decentralised governance (if the Caliph is responsible, however, it must be accepted that the power to appoint and dismiss governors lies with him);
A Caliph that consults the people for their opinion in matters demanding consultation (this could be via a formal body such as a Majlis al Shūrā which is elected, so it genuinely represents people. It should be noted matters of jurisprudence or technical issues cannot be decided by popular opinion in a reliable way, so these matters could only ever be matters of consulting experts and weighing judgement on what is more convincing);
An independent judiciary, meaning that whilst the Caliph (or those delegated to rule) is responsible for establishing courts, the judge cannot be dictated to by the government;
A Caliph that settles differences of opinion in matters which demand that the people are unified on one opinion in order for the society to function.
The title of Caliph
In the discussion between the academics was made of the terminology - ‘Khalīfah’ versus ‘Amīr’ versus ‘Imām’. However, in the context of governance, the terms were historically pretty much used interchangeably to mean the same thing. Though it was mentioned in the interview that Sayyiduna ʿUmar, may Allah be pleased with him, accepted the title Amīr al Mumineen over Khalīfatu-Khalīfati-Rasūlillāh, it was implied (but not explicitly said) that somehow this terminological change licensed adopted different forms of governance to his predecessors in ruling. However, the system of government was fundamentally the same. There might have been some differences on a few fiqhi adoptions on selected matters - and some new styles implemented like the Diwān system, but none of these fundamentally changed the system.
The slur of authoritarianism
During the discussion, the conversants kept conflating the idea of a ‘centralised’ system with authoritarianism.
Would they describe the Prophetic polity or Khilāfah Rāshidah as authoritarian because ruling was centred in the Caliph whilst administration was decentralised?
These models of governance had a centralised ruling structure - i.e. the Prophet ﷺ as a ruler succeeded by the Caliph after his passing- who then appointed local governors to rule in different regions. Whilst they had autonomy to govern and in some cases collect revenues, they could be fired, or reassigned to a different region by the ruler.
By the Caliphate of ʿUmar ibn al Khattāb, the territory under Islamic civilisation covered what would today be Saudi Arabia, Yemen, all the gulf states, Iraq, some of Iran, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, and part of Libya. Governors (Wula) were appointed in different regions, just as the Prophet ﷺ would do. By the end of the era known as Khilāfah Rāshidah, Cyprus, most of Libya, all of Iran, as well as parts of Turkey, Afghanistan and Central Asia.
This was a vast area without today’s means of communication. Yet, governance was achieved.
Authoritarianism is certainly a danger, but not due to centralisation, but due to lack of justice and lack of checks and balances existing in society.
The era of Khilāfah Rāshidah was one which was characterised by accountability. Senior Companions questioned the first Caliph, Sayiduna Abu Bakr, about his decision to deal with three crises at once. There are examples of ordinary Muslims accounting Sayiduna Umar - and questioning Sayyiduna ʿUthmān and Sayyiduna ʿAli about their decisions.
Sayidina ‘Umar, may Allah be pleased with him, appointed Umayr Ibn Saad as governor in the city of Homs. Umayr once said “Islam will remain strong as long as the authority is strong. And the strength of the authority does not come about with the killing by the sword or the lashing by the whip, but by judging with the truth and the upholding of justice.” Upon hearing this ‘Umar said “I wish I had a man like Umayr Ibn Saad to help me with the Muslims’ affairs.”
The early generations were characterised by justice in the courts - such that even the Caliph was ruled against in certain famous cases.
So the quality of the people in terms of their duty of accounting political leaders was an important check on authoritarianism - as was independence of the courts, which ruled with justice.
All of this means that it is shallow and misleading to think that a centralised ruling or unitary system that leads to authoritarianism or renders it impossible to govern over a large geographic area.
There are many other factors that can help to explain why this was possible - and these should be considered and discussed.
But it cannot be that we simply default to today’s failing nation state model based on shallow and misleading arguments.
I had intended this to be a final instalment and to explore more about the nation state model, but in the interests of doing the discussion justice, I have decided to devote another article explore those issues.