Discourses on Khilāfah - Sunnah Paradigm versus Pragmatic Paradigm

Reflections on conversations about Islamic Politics and the Caliphate - Part Five

This is the fifth part of a reflection on a discussion I heard between two Muslim academics about Islamic Politics and the Khilāfah. (The first video is the discussion. The second video is a critique of the same conversation.) 

As mentioned last time, I had intended the last article to be the final instalment. However, the matter of how to achieve the end goal demands some comment. 

In particular, there are more serious and respected commentators who express views as to how to reach the goal of Khilāfah in the contemporary age. 

Sunnah paradigm versus pragmatic paradigm

In the last article we touched upon the Sunnah model of governance. 

What I  did not discuss is that the Prophet’s ﷺ polity started with a small viable nucleus in Al Madinah - which was the start point for extending Islamic governance to new areas, all the time connected to that nucleus as a unitary entity. Part of his ﷺ criteria for accepting nusrah (help or assistance) from the Ansār was their capability to defend the starting point of the new Islamic polity from attacks. This is what I call the ‘Sunnah paradigm’ - i.e. a small viable starting point from which governance was extended. As the territory expanded the Prophet  ﷺ appointed governors who ruled locally. Crucially they were appointed by him and could be dismissed by him (and later by the Khulafaa) 

Let us now explore further what I term the “pragmatic paradigm”. 

I don’t mean this in a derogatory sense. Some of those who advocate for this approach are, in my opinion, very sincere advocates for the Caliphate, who have brought much value to the discussion in the past few years. Their pragmatic approach, even if I disagree with it, is a reflection of their view as to how we might best realise a Caliphate today, and with the least amount of disruption to the status quo. 

The pragmatic paradigm starts from the position of the world as secular nation states, wherein the highest form of authority and loyalty is the nation state itself, which has fixed borders. Politics in those states is supposed to operate in the national interest. 

Pragmatic decentralisation or Sunnah decentralisation? 

Someone might argue that the decentralised aspects of the Sunnah model coincide with the federated aspects of the pragmatic model. Whilst they might look similar, there are important distinctions. As I mentioned before, the Sunnah model is such that the Caliph can appoint and remove governors - whereas the pragmatic model suggests each governorate is much more independent, so increasing the risk of schisms. Also, whilst the Caliph can delegate collection and distribution of revenues to governors, the Caliph might decide to keep these centralised so as to facilitate distribution where it is most necessary. 

It is valid if the Caliph institutes local elections for the governor, and the winner is appointed. However, the Caliph would still have power to dismiss the governor if there is a loss of public confidence regarding their ruling etc. 

The failure of the nation state

The nation state is a western construct based in a secular paradigm. It is not a neutral political model which could be slotted into an Islamic paradigm. 

Europe had been warring for centuries over territory and the balance of power between the Catholic Church and the temporal authority of princes. Ultimately they fell upon the solution of confining political authority to the temporal ruler within fixed borders. Within these borders the ultimate level of supremacy was to the state - even more than to ‘God’, principles, beliefs, conscience, family, tribe etc. Eventually this European model was exported across the world as the de-facto approach, including the Muslim world.

The nation state is increasingly seen to be a failing model. In the west, where it is most established, there is an almost permanent tension these days between those who see the benefits of globalisation, and so accept the necessity of surrendering some sovereignty to supranational bodies (whether the EU, UN, international courts, IMF, WTO etc) - and, on the other hand, those who see surrendering any sovereignty to those bodies as a betrayal of the nation. In Britain, this has been playing out between Remainers and Brexiteers. In  France, between supporters of Marine Le Pen and Macron. In the USA, between the supporters of Donald Trump and his mainly Democrat opponents. These are fault lines so dangerous that there was rioting at the US Capitol on January 6th 2021 - seen by many as an attempted coup, with others even refusing to accept the presidency of Joe Biden as legitimate.

Moreover, nation states have found it hard to maintain the loyalty of their different regions. In Britain, the kingdom has not felt very united for a long time. Scotland, Wales, England and Northern Ireland increasingly feel like four different countries in a troubled marriage. Divorce is not off the table, but the only reason it has not progressed is that everyone knows it will be very messy. 

In the Muslim world, this nation state model is utterly unnatural for many reasons. The borders that exist are mostly no more than 120 years old, mainly originating following World War One. These borders divided people who often shared beliefs, language, historical experiences, culture, resources and more besides. They have only really been maintained due to external powers propping whichever regime best suits their interests. National identities do exist, as does the idea of ‘national interest’, whereby political leaders justify ‘normalisation’ with the occupiers of Palestine and inaction when it comes to intervening to rescue the Palestinian people. 

Yet, they are not so well established that they cannot be challenged by ideas of “Ummah”, and loyalty to Islamic principles. This is evidenced by many issues, for example the support displayed for Palestine at football matches  by ordinary people, even though their governments betray the Palestinians. Also by the extreme fear in western capitals that the balance of power in the Middle East could change at any time - for why else do they send aircraft carriers to the region to support the Zionist entity? It is also evidenced by the increased interest in the historical Caliphate which crossed today’s borders. 

The conversants in the interview under discussion recognised some of this. How, it was asked, do you convince Qatar to share their money with Egypt? i.e. overcome the idea of national interest. They suggested we need to accept this current model, with its flaws and work towards incremental change. Why not, they said, solve the problems in one country, first? And then? Unfortunately, I don’t recall hearing a ‘and then’. 

The OIC is often touted as the starting point - but the entity is not a credible one at present, and I have already outlined some of the challenges. 

There are many problems with this approach which the conversants did not address but which warrant some comment. 

Challenges that need to be overcome:

External Factors

Nation states in the Muslim world  are affected to a lesser or greater extent by external influence from global powers. Moreover, they are affected by the same problems as mature democracies in that they are dominated by a political class that serves elites rather than the ordinary people of their states. 

This would mean that convergence towards an Islamic political unification would be resisted by those colonial powers and by the elites who might feel they would lose their permanent material advantage from a more egalitarian Islamic model. 

Surrendering Sovereignty

Those factors aside, let us imagine that we were dealing with hypothetical independent-minded nation states. They would have to convince their populations and political class to subjugate some aspects of national sovereignty to the supranational Islamic polity of the Caliphate. Even to reach a ‘united federal states’ model like the USA, or an Islamic attempt of a European Union (based on the OIC for example) - which goes further than the EU has managed with political and fiscal union (NB, the EU’s current degree of political and economic union looks ever more fragile, and is certainly moving away from the ‘ever closer union’ enshrined in its treaties) - it would require a clear strategic decision on the part of these states that they will cede national powers to the supranational polity. 

The two most powerful countries - Germany and France -  were keen for a trade union and even economic union. But when the financial crisis of 2008-2009 disproportionately affected the southern European countries more, like Greece, divisions became obvious. The richer, more economically successful countries did not like bailing out their poorer, less successful partners. Countries like Greece resented the austerity measures that were imposed on them, suddenly feeling the imbalance of the partnership. These events  marked the halt of the European project converging towards any kind of political union.

Convergence at the same speed

Moreover, that strategic direction - to move away from the supremacy of the nation, to the supremacy of the Shari’ah in collective matters such as foreign policy, defence, economic policy (including currency, customs, trade and fiscal matters) - would have to be achieved in all these states at a similar period of time to allow convergence. It would require popular opinion and the opinion of the political class to change in all these places. 

Change for interests or Islam?

Crucially such a change would have to be for the sake of Islam, because if it were for the sake of national interest, we would see opinion advancing and regressing depending on what is advantageous for any state at any particular time. Powerful states and richer Muslim countries would have to be willing to sacrifice for weaker and poorer ones, and the only motivation that could really guarantee this happening would be one linked to an aqīdah which is both political and spiritual. 

“Let’s solve problems in one region first”

Some say ‘let’s solve problems in one region first’. Such an attitude would see people prioritise the local benefit other than the Shari’ah priority of unity. Why would people in any oil-rich gulf state share ‘their’ wealth with Egypt - if they thought of it as ‘theirs’ and not the Ummah’s? 

Islam views matters like energy resources as public property, not to be monopolised by the few. 

Ibn Majah relates that Abu Hurairah that the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) said: 

“Three things cannot be denied to anyone: water, pasture and fire.” 

(The latter encompasses energy).

When political leaders appeal to the national interest, it is appealing to the basest of instincts. General Musharraf epitomised this when he facilitated the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, saying ‘Pakistan first’. His statement unfortunately was welcomed by a section of society that thought it was putting its own interests above those of their brothers and sisters on the other side of the artificial, colonially drawn Durrant Line. Yet his policy, aside from being against Islamic principles, brought a decade of destabilisation to Pakistan by drawing it into the conflict despite his weak-minded approach. He echoed this when mooting the idea of recognising the Zionist occupation of Palestine in the event of an eventual two-state solution, by saying ‘we should not be more Palestinian than the Palestinians’ - against the idea that the occupation of the Blessed Land is an Islamic issue not a national one.

The Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) described the Ummah like one body - yet national identities would have you believe that it is preferable for a limbed to be severed from the body. 

The Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) paired an Ansari from Aws and Khazraj in Al Madinah, with an Muhajir from Makkah - the former being expected to sacrifice some of their material wealth for the latter. Thus he implemented policies to reinforce values. 

Limits to national solutions to national problems 

What if some problems cannot be solved within the existing nation state models? Especially if the artificial borders drawn by colonial powers left disputes over land, water and resources. 

Egypt is rich in human resources and very fertile, with the ability to feed its own population (though IMF changes to the economy means it imports staple foods like wheat rather than being self-sufficient). Yet it is energy poor. 

Libya is energy rich, but has a smaller population and is not as fertile. 

These examples show that many problems in the divided Muslim world could be easier addressed through unified thinking rather than the narrow and backward thinking of how to solve problems within existing borders.

The rigged political and economic systems

Political structures in Muslim countries favour the elites. Whether royal families like the house of Saud, or through the democratic system tying political success to deals with the rich elites - such as in Pakistan. 

There is no incentive for this political class to change. To borrow a metaphor - Goats don’t vote for Eid al Adha! 

Moreover, the global capitalist, interest-based financial system keeps everyone locked into a system - not just through global trade but also through currencies being pegged to the US-dollar. 

Making a radical shift away from the global system to independence

Ultimately, whether through a radical change - with a regime change coupled with system change in one region, facilitated through power brokers in that society - or the gradual change of convergence, argued in an idealistic and simplistic way by the conversants in the interview, there would come a point at which there would need to be a shift away from the global economic system to independence. Moves towards that would be seen as hostile before they even happened, and there is no doubt that as soon as the global powers sense a shift in that direction, they would use influence to try to stop it. So there is even a political argument for an effort toward rapid radical change, rather than gradual moves which allows the efforts to be undermined by external powers. 

A much-needed ongoing discussion

The points of reflection that I have raised in brief in these few short articles should be seen as part of a longer conversation needed amongst serious thinkers for change.

Those who prefer to think solely about individual reform would of course find discussions about systemic change a distraction to their industry. 

To give an analogy, a society with a broken health system might have a burgeoning industry for traditional healers or lone-physicians who treat individuals. But the society needs a health system - from public health, to primary care and secondary care. It needs policies to address food security, and so address malnutrition. It needs policies to address polluted water, and so reduce infectious disease. 

The lone physician or traditional healer might find a conflict of interest if there is an opinion calling for an overhaul of the system. There should not be a conflict, but if you’re focussed on your own agenda, not the health of the community you might think there is one. 

All of us need to address our own relationship with Allah and each other. But that does not solve the very real systemic problems we have causing disunity, allowing oppression and subjugation and the hoarding of wealth.

So let us further the discussions in a positive and meaningful way, to work towards a revival of Islam as a civilisation and way of life in the Muslim world.